The Western approach has been to train Ukrainian forces in combined-arms maneuver in an effort to have them fight more like a NATO military would, similar to what the West has taught in past train-and-assist programs. The challenge with this approach is that NATO militaries are unaccustomed to fighting without air superiority, especially air superiority established and maintained by American airpower, or at least with the logistics and enabling capabilities that the United States typically brings to the fight. As a result, Ukrainian soldiers must tackle Russia’s prepared defenses without the kind of air support and logistics that their Western instructors have long been accustomed to. Russia’s defenses are not impenetrable, but they could be strong enough to attrit Ukrainian forces over multiple defensive lines, while buying time so reinforcements can arrive. Their defense-in-depth is designed to prevent a tactical breakthrough from achieving strategic effects—in particular, to stop a Ukrainian breakthrough from generating momentum. The upcoming offensive will therefore test the current theory of success in Kyiv and across contributing Western capitals: that Ukrainian forces, trained and equipped with Western systems, can fight more effectively and break through fortified Russian lines. https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2023/05/10/beyond-ukraines-offensive-2/content.html
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Date: Wednesday, 10 May 2023 17:31 (UTC)The Western approach has been to train Ukrainian forces in combined-arms maneuver in an effort to have them fight more like a NATO military would, similar to what the West has taught in past train-and-assist programs. The challenge with this approach is that NATO militaries are unaccustomed to fighting without air superiority, especially air superiority established and maintained by American airpower, or at least with the logistics and enabling capabilities that the United States typically brings to the fight. As a result, Ukrainian soldiers must tackle Russia’s prepared defenses without the kind of air support and logistics that their Western instructors have long been accustomed to.
Russia’s defenses are not impenetrable, but they could be strong enough to attrit Ukrainian forces over multiple defensive lines, while buying time so reinforcements can arrive. Their defense-in-depth is designed to prevent a tactical breakthrough from achieving strategic effects—in particular, to stop a Ukrainian breakthrough from generating momentum. The upcoming offensive will therefore test the current theory of success in Kyiv and across contributing Western capitals: that Ukrainian forces, trained and equipped with Western systems, can fight more effectively and break through fortified Russian lines.
https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2023/05/10/beyond-ukraines-offensive-2/content.html